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CIA Used Federal Narcotics Officers and Safehouses to Dose Unwitting People “at All Social Levels”

The CIA’s 1963 Inspector General report found that, from 1955, Technical Services Division ran covert drug tests on people who had not consented, using Bureau of Narcotics agents, safehouses, and ordinary social settings.

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From 1955, according to the CIA Inspector General’s Report of Inspection of MKULTRA, the Agency did not confine drug testing to volunteers in laboratories. Covert testing on unwitting U.S. citizens began that year. Technical Services Division’s doctrine, the report stated, was that accepted scientific testing “fails to disclose the full pattern of reactions and attributions that may occur in operational situations.” The Inspector General reviewed the rationale and the risks and recommended that such testing in the United States be terminated.

The “final phase,” the report explained, was application to unwitting subjects in normal life settings. Volunteer testing, in TSD’s view, could not establish disabling or discrediting effects or interrogation effectiveness. The work was therefore taken out of controlled scientific conditions and into ordinary life.

The mechanism was an informal arrangement with cleared, witting individuals in the Bureau of Narcotics. A West Coast senior representative and an assistant were in place in 1955. A parallel East Coast arrangement followed in 1961. The Bureau Director was briefed. The Deputy Chief of TSD — identified in the same Inspector General report as Dr. Sidney Gottlieb — had guided MKULTRA from its inception and believed, the report said, that the Director would disclaim knowledge if the arrangement were compromised.

The MKULTRA programme director supervised the testing and visited the sites. $10,000 was provided annually to each of the two projects for cultivation of targets and a safehouse in each area.

The people used as subjects were not a narrow criminal sample alone. Subjects included informers or “members of suspect criminal elements.” Testing was also “on a variety of individuals” at all social levels, “native American and foreign.” The Church Committee later quoted the same passage in Book I of its 1976 final report.

Scientific observation was often infeasible. Bureau agents were not qualified scientific observers, and subjects were seldom accessible after the first hours. The consequences were not theoretical. “In a number of instances,” the Inspector General wrote, “the test subject has become ill for hours or days, including hospitalization in at least one case.” The Church Committee repeated that finding as well.

Record-keeping was deliberately thin. Present practice, the Inspector General wrote, was to maintain no records of the planning and approval of test programmes. Propriety rested with the MKULTRA programme director and the Deputy Chief of TSD. Handling of subjects was left to the narcotics agent working alone. Non-Agency personnel were fully witting of CIA sponsorship.

The Rockefeller Commission, reporting in June 1975 and working from the same episode, noted that the detailed files had been destroyed. It placed the start of unsuspecting tests in 1955 under an informal arrangement it associated with a later federal drug bureau, originally on the West Coast, with a similar East Coast programme in 1961. The bureau name used in that Commission sentence does not match the Inspector General’s 1963 wording, and the later bureau was created after the events described. The contemporary Inspector General report identified the partner as the Bureau of Narcotics, and that is the wording used here.

The official picture is therefore consistent on the core facts and carefully bounded on the institutional name. From 1955 on the West Coast, and from 1961 on the East Coast, the CIA used federal narcotics officers, safehouses, and ordinary social settings to administer tests to people who had not consented, at all social levels. The Agency’s own Inspector General recommended that the practice be stopped. Subjects had already been made ill for hours or days, and at least one had been hospitalised. The programme director visited the sites; $10,000 a year went to each coast for targets and a safehouse; and the men handling the subjects were narcotics agents working alone, fully aware that the CIA was the sponsor, while the Agency itself kept no records of the planning and approval of the tests.

Sources

  • CIA Inspector General, Report of Inspection of MKULTRA, 26 July 1963 (C06767515), PDF pp.9, 12–17 (printed doc pp.7, 10–15).
  • Church Committee, Final Report, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence (1976), pp.391, 400.
  • Rockefeller Commission Report, June 1975 (GPO print), p.227 (PDF p.247), on the destroyed files and the 1955 and 1961 dates. The Commission’s bureau name is not used here, for the reason given in the article.

Sources

  1. CIA Inspector General, Report of Inspection of MKULTRA, 26 July 1963 (C06767515), PDF pp.9, 12–17 (printed doc pp.7, 10–15)., Central Intelligence Agency (Internet Archive mirror of FOIA release C06767515). Accessed 12 November 2026.
  2. Church Committee, Final Report, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence (1976), pp.391, 400., U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Accessed 12 November 2026.
  3. Rockefeller Commission Report, June 1975 (GPO print), p.227 (PDF p.247), on the destroyed files and the 1955 and 1961 dates. The Commission’s bureau name is not used here, for the reason given in the article., Internet Archive (Boston Public Library scan of the GPO print). Accessed 12 November 2026.

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